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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established in
1941 in memory of Ernest II. Lindley, Chancellor of the University of
Kansas from 1920 to 1939. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, the
chairman of the committee in charge, suggested in the Graduate Magazine
that
the Chancellor should invite to. the University for a lecture or a
scries of lectures, some outstanding national or world figure to
speak on "Values of Living"—just as the late Chancellor
proposed to do in his courses "The Human Situation" and
"Plan for Living."
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf of the
Committee, proposing in somewhat broader terms that
The income from this fund should be spent in a quest of social
betterment by bringing to the University each year outstanding
world leaders for a lecture or scries of lectures, yet with a design
so broad in its outline that in the years to come, if it is deemed
wise, this living memorial could take some more desirable form.
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International
Relations." The next lecture was given in 1959 by Professor Everett C.
Hughes, and has been published by the University of Kansas School of
Law as part of his book Students' Culture and Perspectives: Lectures on Medical
and Genera! Education. The selection of lecturers for the Lindley series has
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Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator
Gilbert Harman
One important type of ethical theory treats moral properties as
analogous in certain respects to "secondary qualities" like colors.
According to this sort of theory, whether something is right or wrong
depends on how impartial spectators would react to it. In the 18th
Century, the Scottish philosophers Francis Hutcheson, David Hume,
and Adam Smith explored theories of this type.1 In the 20th Century
this sort of theory has sometimes been discussed under the name "ideal
observer theory."2 Recently, especially in England, there has been
renewed interest in this sort of ethical theory and its comparison
between moral properties and secondary qualities.3
One possible objection to an impartial spectator theory is that it
seems to require an -overly aesthetic conception of morality to take the
primary point of view in ethics to be that of a spectator rather than that
of the agent.4 If the spectator is taken to be primary, then the agent's
aim would seem to be to produce something that will or would please the
spectator. But that is just wrong. Such an aim is too "outer directed" to
count as a moral motive. Morality is more agcnt-ccntcrcd than that. It is
much more plausible to take the agent's point of view as primary. In the
first instance morality is a matter of the moral reasons an agent has to
act in one way or another, where these reasons derive from the relevant
moral rules rather than from a desire to gain the approval of spectators.
A few years ago, I pressed this objection myselfwhen I discussed the
ideal observer theory in a textbook of ethics.5 But I was too hasty. In
reading Adam Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments, I discovered that
Smith explicitly considers this issue and provides a plausible reply to the
objection.
Because 20th Century discussions have tended not to consider such
"psychological" questions as why agents might be motivated to act in
ways that impartial spectators would approve (or, for that matter, why
impartial spectators would care about anything), I will in this paper
ignore recent discussion and return to the three great versions of the
theory that were developed in the 18th Century by Hutcheson, Hume,
and Smith, indicating why I think Smith's version of the theory is
superior to the others.
Analogy with Secondary Qualities
Hutcheson and Hume each modeled an impartial spectator theory of
moral right and wrong after a normal-perceiver theory of secondary
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qualities like color, taste, sound, etc. The theory of color, for example,
takes facts about colors to be facts about the reactions of normal
perceivers under ideal lighting conditions. For an object to be red is, in
this view, for the object to be such that it would look red to normal
observers in good light. Similarly, according to Hutcheson and Hume,
for an action to be wrong is for the action to be such that it would
displease normal observers under conditions ideal for reacting to
actions.
This sort of account explainsa property by appeal to the psychologi
cal experience of an observer. Redness is explained in terms of an
observer's visual experience—how things look to an observer. Wrong-
ness is explained in terms of moral experience—how things feel to an
observer, what attitude (positive or negative) the observer takes.
The relevant experience does not have to be actual. It is the
experience an observer would have under certain ideal conditions. In
yellow light, an object may look orange to observers but actually be
red—if it would look red to normal observers in good white light. An
action can seem hateful to actual biased or uninformed observers but
really be morally right—if the action would be favored by impartial
spectators who knew all the facts.
In fact, this distinction between actual and merely hypothetical
reactions was not so clear in the 18th Century. Philosophers who
adopted this general approach were apt to worry over the question
whether a falling tree makes any sound if no one hears it. The correct
answer should have been that the tree does make a loud sound, because,
if someone had been there, he or she would have heard something. But
philosophers did not alwayssee the possibilityof this response. Berkeley
thought that the only way to allow for the sound of the falling tree was to
have the sound heard by God. Indeed, God was needed even for the
tree, since without God's perception, not only would there be no sound,
but the tree itself would not be there to fall, according to Berkeley.
Hume rejected God as a way of saving the falling tree and its sound and
concluded that the unperceived tree was a confused fiction we postulate
to give order to our experience of the forest.
But, although 18th Century proponents of theories of this sort do not
clearly distinguish between actual and hypothetical reactions of spec
tators, once the distinction is recognized, it is clear that theories of this
sort should refer to hypothetical reactions rather than actual reactions of
observers.6
Even so there are problems.7 It seems possible that there might be a
red object that would turn green if placed in good light. This red object
would look green to normal observers if placed in good light. How can
that be, if for the object to be red is for it to be such that it would look red
to normal observers if placed in good light? One possible answer is that
the object would indeed look red if placed in good light and the object
were not to change color. (But then what is it in this view for something
to change color?)
Similarly, it seems possible that there could be a wrong action that
would have been right if only the act had been considered by impartial
spectators. Its bad consequences might outweigh its good consequences,
but, if it had been considered by impartial spectators as an example, it
would have had enough additional good consequences to turn the act
into the right thing to do! Then we seem to have a wrong action that
would be approved by impartial spectators if they considered it, again
violating the claim of this sort of spectator theory. A possible response is
to say that an act is wrong if the act would be disapproved of by
impartial spectators who considered the act as it actually was, ignoring
any features or consequences attaching to the act through its being
considered by the spectators. However there are probably other versions
of this objection that escape this response.
But let us forget about these (admittedly serious) problems to return
to the basic idea behind impartial spectator theories, namely, that the
Tightness or wrongness of actions is dependent on the actual or
hypothetical reactions of impartial spectators in a way that is analogous
to the way in which what color something is depends on how it looks or
would look to normal observers in good light.
Ofcourse, the analogy can only be partial. One important difference
is that an impartial moral spectator does not have to perceive the act being
judged. It is enough for the "spectator" to be given a sufficiently full
description of the act. Indeed, the act itself may well be merely
hypothetical. The agent may be considering whether to do it or not. If
the act is wrong, let us hope that the agent does not carry it out. In that
case, the act does not exist.
The important point of the analogy is that, just as the theory of color
takes color judgments to be about the hypothetical reactions of normal
perceivers in ideal situations, an impartial spectator theory takes moral
judgments to be judgments about the hypothetical reactions of impar
tial, knowledgeable people. So, in this view, to say that something is
morally right is, roughly speaking, to say that impartial spectators are or
would be in favor of it. To say that something is wrong is to say that
impartial spectators arc or would be opposed to it.
Key Issuesfor Impartial Spectator Theories
I now want to consider the following two issues for impartial
spectator theories in ethics. First, why should an agent care about the
reactions of spectators? Second, why should an impartial spectator care
about what an agent does?
The first issue lies behind the objection to impartial spectator
theories that I have already mentioned. According to such a theory, the
desire to do what is right is the desire to act in a way that spectators will
approve. But that is too "outer directed". Such a desire is precisely not
a desire to do something simply because it is right.
Impartial spectator theories might try to avoid this objection by
arguing that agents are not motivated directly to do what spectators
would approve of. A moral agent's intention is not of the form, "Let me
do what would gain an impartial spectator's approval." Rather, the
agent's intention has the form, "Let me do D," where in fact doing D
will be something that impartial spectators would approve but that fact
is not the agent's reason for doing D. Now, an adequate impartial
spectator theory cannot treat it as a mere coincidence that moral agents
are motivated to act in ways that impartial spectators would approve. So
this leaves the problem of explaining how moral agents come to act in
ways that impartial spectators would approve of without the agents'
having the specific intention to act in that way.
The second issue for an impartial spectator theory concerns why the
spectator cares about what the agent docs. This issue lies behind the
question whether the reason an act is right is that impartial spectators
favor it or rather the reason that impartial spectators favor the act is that
the act is right. In the dialogue Euthyphro, Plato has Socrates ask a
similar question of the view that something is good if and only if it is
beloved by the gods: Are actions good because they are loved by the
gods or are the relevant actions loved by the gods because the actions are
good? Socrates raises the question in order to insinuate that the correct
answer is the second one, good actions are loved by the gods because the
actions are good, whereas the theory he is discussing must argue that the
correct answer is the first one, good actions are good because they are
loved by the gods.
Both answers cannot be right. It cannot be true both (1) that for an
action to be good is for it to be loved by the gods and also (2) that what
the gods love about the action is that the action is good. For that would
imply that what the gods love about the action is that they love it, which
is perverse.
Similarly, it might be argued against an impartial spectator theory
that the second option is the correct one: truly impartial spectators favor
actions that are right because the actions are right. Impartial spectator
theories are necessarily committed to taking the first option here: acts
are right because they would be favored by impartial spectators, who
must therefore favor these acts for other reasons than that the actions arc
right. For it would be perverse to suppose that what impartial spectators
would favor in these acts is that the acts would be favored by impartial
spectators. This leaves the problem of saying what it is that would lead
impartial spectators to fa%'or one or another course of action.
To summarize, any impartial spectator theory in ethics needs to say
what explains an agent's moral motivation, what explains a spectator's
reaction, and why these two things, agent's motivation and spectator's
reaction, should be correlated with each other.
Hulcheson's Theory
Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) appeals to benevolence to answer these
questions. In his view, people are innately disposed to like other people's
being happy and to dislike others' being unhappy. On the one hand, this
tendency motivates agents to act so as to make other people happier. On
the other hand, it leads spectators to favor such actions and to oppose
actions that have the opposite tendency.
In Hutcheson's view an agent acts morally in order to make other people
happier. The agent is not motivated to act so as to gain the approval of
spectators. To be sure, the agent is motivated to act in a way that
spectators would approve. Although this is not an intended aspect of the
agent's action, it is also no accident, because the same sort of benev
olence that leads the agent to act as he or she does also leads the spectator
to approve of so acting.
The agent's act is right because impartial spectators would favor the
agent's acting in that way. Spectators would not in the first instance
favor the act because the act is right but would favor the act because they
want people to be happy and the act makes people happy.
This view yields classical utilitarianism. In Hutcheson's words,
"that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the
greatest Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions
Misery."8
This is an elegant theory, but it faces a serious objection. The
account of moral motivation is implausible. Benevolence is too weak a
motive to be identified with the motive to do what is right. People arc
sometimes motivated by benevolence to try to improve the lot of other
people, but this motivation is normally quite feeble when compared with
ordinary people's aversions to murder, injuring others, stealing, lying,
and failing to keep their promises or pay their debts. Generalized
benevolence is normally a much weaker motive than self-interest. But
the moral motives just mentioned—to avoid killing others, and so
forth—are often just as strong as and sometimes stronger than self-
interest. Generalized benevolence cannot be the whole story about
moral motivation.
Hume's Theory
Impressed by these facts about moral motivation, Hume, like
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679)9 and Bernard de Mandeville (1670-
1733),10 sees self-interest as an important aspect of the motivation of
certain moral acts, namely acts of "justice" such as telling the truth and
keeping promises. But, unlike Hobbes and Mandeville and like
Hutcheson, Hume argues that benevolence (based on what he calls
"sympathy") is another aspect. Self-interest is involved because, if you
cannot be trusted to tell the truth, keep your promises or avoid injuring
your associates, people will not join up with you in common enterprises
and you will lose out in comparison with other people who do tell the
truth, keep their promises, and avoid injury to associates. So you have a
strong self-interested reason to keep your obligations.
In this view, self-interest leads people to enter into cooperation with
others. Over time, cooperation becomes more formalized into a system
of cooperation. The overall system of cooperation makes people better
off, so benevolent spectators approve of this self-interested motivation.
It therefore counts as moral motivation.
Hume allows for benevolent motivation in addition to self-interest.
Benevolent feelings in the agent may reinforce self-interested behavior,
leading to even stronger motivation. But benevolence by itself is a weak
motive. So the motive to be charitable to others is weaker than the
motive to keep your obligations. Charity is not in your interest in the
way that promise keeping is.
If benevolence plays only a small role in moral motivation, it plays
more of a role in explaining the reactions of spectators, in Hume's view.
Impartial spectators are (by definition) not personally affected by the
agent's act, so self-interest does not favor or oppose the act. Benevolence
is therefore the sole source of a spectator's approval or disapproval.
Hume offers an explanation of benevolence in terms of what he calls
"sympathy". This contrasts with Hutcheson who simply postulates that
God has made us benevolent.
Hume's account of sympathy goes like this. To think of someone else
as in pain is to have a painful feeling yourself but located in your image
of the other person. To think of another person as pleased is to have a
pleasurable feeling located in your image of that person. So, it is
pleasant to think that others are happy and unpleasant to think that
others are unhappy. That is why impartial spectators prefer agents to do
things that tend to make people happier.
For Hume the association of ideas plays an important role in
determining what spectators will approve of. When the spectator thinks
of the agent acting in a certain way, association of ideas leads the
spectator to think of the typical effects of such an action. This thought
makes the spectator happy to the extent that these envisioned typical
effects involve happiness. So, to the extent that Hume's theory is
utilitarian, it tends toward rule utilitarianism rather than act utilitarian
ism.
Roughly speaking, act utilitarianism says that an act is right to the
extent that that very act makes people happier or less unhappy. Rule
utilitarianism says that an act is right to the extent that acts of that sort
tend to make people happier or less unhappy. Now, any given particular
act is of many different sorts of act, so a crucial question for rule
utilitarianism is to decide which are the relevant sorts of act for the
purposes of moral evaluation. In Hume's version of the theory, this is a
psychological question: in thinking about a particular act, a spectator
will associate that act with various other acts; this psychological
association determines what the relevant sorts of act are for the purposes
of moral evaluation.
Hume's theory has little difficulty with the second problem facing an
impartial spectator theory, the problem of accounting for the spectator's
approval of right actions without supposing the spectator approves of
them because they are right. In Hume's view a spectator's approval
arises simply from the spectator's sympathetic thought of the pleasures
and pains produced by the agent's act and any associated acts, not from
any judgment that the act is right. The act is right because it is favored,
not favored because it is right.
But Hume's account of moral motivation is still not very plausible.
In his view, a moral agent acts largely out of self-interest or out of habits
for which there is a self-interested justification. This is an outer-directed
motivation—the agent is concerned with the reactions of others because
he or she wants them to continue dealing with him or her.
This seems wrong. As Kant objects, a shopkeeper who gives children
the correct change because it would be bad for his business if people
were to think he or she cheated children is doing the right thing, but not
acting from a moral motive. The shopkeeper's act has no particular
moral worth."
Hutcheson identifies the moral motive with benevolence. That seems
a motive of the right sort to be a moral motive—it is aimed in the right
direction—but it is not a strong enough motive. (Kant famously
disagrees, holding that benevolent motivation too is of no moral worth.
But here Kant's view is counter-intuitive.) People's moral motivation is
much stronger than their benevolence. Hume takes the moral motive to
be mainly self-interest, which is a strong enough motive, but a motive
that does not seem to be aimed in the right direction.
Adam Smith's Theory
Adam Smith (1723-1790) bases his positive theory on an insightful
criticism of Hume's account of sympathy. Smith points out that Hume is
wrong to suppose that merely knowing what another person feels is
sufficient for sympathy with that person. You might very well not
sympathize with another person's feelings if you thought those feelings
were inappropriate to the situation. Consider someone who is very upset
over a minor scratch on his knee from a fall, for example. You can
understand perfectly well how upset the person is without at all
sympathizing with the person's extreme agitation.
Smith observes, further, that Hume is also wrong in taking sympa
thy with another person's pain to be always entirely unpleasant. It is
more unpleasant to have to have dealings with someone who is
inappropriately unhappy, too upset about something the person ought to
treat as a trifle, than it is to have dealings with someone who is upset to
the same extent but for an appropriate reason. In the first case, you do
not sympathize with the person; in the second case you do sympathize
with the person. The other person's pain is easier to take if you can
sympathize with that person.
Smith thinks Hume is right about the importance of sympathy in
ethics but wrong about what sympathy is and why it is important.
For Smith, the key point is that sympathy is desirable. Not only do
spectators want to be able to sympathize with agents, but agents also
want the sympathy of spectators. This gives agents a motive to try to
have reactions of the sort that spectators can sympathize with.
Furthermore, in Smith's view, "Sympathy . . . does not arise so
much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which
excites it."12 This gives a spectator a standard forjudging the other
agent. The spectator imagines him or herself in the circumstances of the
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agent and imagines how he or she would react in those circumstancs. If
the agent's reaction is similar to the reaction the spectator imagines
having, the spectator sympathizes with the agent. If the agent's reaction
is more extreme than the spectator's imagined reaction, the spectator
does not sympathize with the agent.
Spectators approve of reactions they can sympathize with and
disapprove of reactionsthey cannot sympathize with. In Smith's words,
"To approve or disapprove ... of the opinions of others is acknowl
edged, by every body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement
or disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with regard to
our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or passions of
others."13
Smith's approach leads to a very different conception of the content
of ethics. Hutcheson's and Hume's theories imply utilitarianism. The
aim is to maximize happiness and minimize unhappiness. Smith's
theory has no such implication. Spectators do not just add up pleasures
and pains.
Smith's normative theory is more stoical than utilitarian. His
approach puts considerable importance on self-control. According to
Smith, the feelings an ordinary nonidcal spectator imagines having in a
given situation are rarely as intense as the feelings the spectator or
someone else would have in that situation. What an actual spectator
imagines an agent feeling is rarely as intense as what the agent actually
is feeling. So, the reaction the spectator imagines having in the agent's
circumstances tends not to be as extreme as the agent's actual reaction
would be if that reaction were not influenced by the thought of how the
reaction might appear to spectators. Since a person wants sympathy
after stubbing a toe, the person will not for long yell and shout and
moan, but will try to restrain his or her feelings so as not to appear
ridiculous.
Of course, a more knowledgeable impartial spectator would not
underestimate the intensity of an agent's pain. But such a spectator
would still favor restraint in the agent's reactions, because the reaction
that the spectator (correctly) envisions having in the agent's circum
stances would be restrained. The spectator would by now have acquired
a habit of restraint in reactions as a way of obtaining the sympathy of
people who do underestimate the intensity of pains in others.
In Smith's view, the spectator's reactions are heavily influenced by
convention. A spectator tries to imagine how he or she would react in the
agent's circumstances. But, if the spectator were in the agent's circum
stances, he or she would try to modify an otherwise natural reaction so
as to accord with the imagined reactions of other not necessarily ideal
spectators. This means that a spectator will be influenced strongly by his
or her expectations of how people ordinarily act and react. Conventional
ways of acting and reacting serve as evidenceabout the feelings of other
impartial spectators. When a givenspectatoris imagininghowhe or she
would react, since the spectator will imagine acting in ways that other
spectators will sympathize with, what he or she imagines will be skewed
in the direction of the conventional reactions. So, Smith's theory is
much more conventionalistic than Hutcheson's or even Hume's. Hume
takesconventionto be important because conventions are useful: people
are happier because of what they can accomplish when they adhere to
conventions. But for Smith conventions have a more direct effect. The
conventions a spectator participates in determine how the spectator will
react and so determine what reactions the spectator will sympathize
with.
How does Smith handle the problems with which we began? His
response to the second problem concerning spectators' reasons for
favoring certain actions is the same as the response made by Hutcheson
and Hume. The spectatorsapproveor disapprove of actionsdepending
on whether or not they can sympathize with them. Acts are wrong
because spectators disapprove of them, i.e. because they do not
sympathize with them. It is not that the spectators disapprove of the acts
because the acts are wrong.
But what about the first problem concerning the motivation of moral
agents? Hutcheson's appeal to benevolence did not work because of the
weakness of benevolence. Hume's appeal to self-interest refers to a
strong enough motive, but one that is too outer directed if it is involved
in the way that Hume thinks it is involved. It may seem that Smith's
theory resembles Hume's in this respect. Here again it looks as if the
envisioned source of moral motivation is strong enough but too outer
directed. Smith seems to be saying that moral motivation is motivation
to act so as to obtain the sympathy of spectators. That seems quite
wrong.
But in fact, Smith explicitly denies that moral motivation is moti
vation so as to obtain the sympathy of others. An agent is motivated to
be worthy of praise.
The love of praise-worthinessis by no means derived altogether from
the love of praise. . . .
The love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those
whose character and conduct we approve of, necessarily dispose us to
desire to become ourselves the objects of the like agreeable sentiments,
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and to be as amiable and as admirable as those whom we love and
admire the most. . . . Emulation, the anxious desire that we ourselves
should excel, is originally founded in our admiration of the excellence of
others. Neither can we be satisfied with being merely admired for what
other people are admired. We must at least believe ourselves to be
admirable for what they are admirable. . . . |If others praise us, their]
praise necessarily strengthens our own sense of our own praise-
worthiness. In this case, so far is the love of praise-worthiness from being
derived altogether from that of praise; that the love of praise seems, at
least in a great measure, to be derived from that of praise-worthiness.14
In order to accommodate this observation, Smith postulates a
primitive desire to be worthy of praise.
Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an
originaldesire to please, and an originalaversion to offend his brethren.
She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their
unfavourable regard. . . .
But this desire of the approbation, and this aversion to the disap
probation of his brethren, would not alone have rendered him fit for that
society for which he was made. Nature, accordingly, has endowed him,
not only with a desire of being approved of, but with a desire of being
what ought to be approved of; or of being what he himself approves of in
other men.15
This passage is difficult to interpret, since a desire "of being what
ought to be approved of" is not quite the same as a desire "of being
what [one] approves of in other men." And, simply postulating a desire
to be "what ought to be approved of" would not eliminate the difficulty.
According to Smith's impartial spectator theory, a desire to be "what
ought to be approved of is precisely a desire to be such that impartial
spectators wouldapprove of oneself. But, as Smith emphasizes at length,
that desire is not yet of the right sort.
A desire to be "what he himself approves of in other men" is more to
the point, if it means a desire to be "what he himself would approve of in
others from an impartial perspective." But Smith does not really
postulate any such desire as a basic unexplained fact about people.
Instead, he offers a more complex account of moral motivation that
anticipates certain elements of Freud's theory of the super-ego. Smith
holds that, at first, a child is motivated to restrain its reactions so as to
have the sympathy of parents and other spectators. As an aid in doing
this, the child tries to view itself as seen by others. Eventually, it acquires
a habit of doing this—a habit of pretending to be an impartial spectator
of its own actions and reactions to see which actions it approves and
which it disapproves. The child then tries to restrain its reactions so as to
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be approved by this pretend spectator—the litde person within who now
serves as a kind of inner conscience.
When I endeavour to examine my own conduct, when I endeavour
to pass sentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is
evident that, in all such cases, I divide myself, as it were, into two
persons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different
character from that other I, the person whose conduct is examined into
and judged of. The first is the spectator, whose sentiments with regard to
my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his
situation, and by considering how it would appear to mc, when seen
from that particular point of view. The second is the agent, the person
whom I properly call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character
of a spectator, I was endeavouring to form some opinion. The first is the
judge; the second the person judged of. But that the judge should, in
every respect, be the same with the person judged of, is as impossible as
that the cause should, in every respect, be the same with the efTect.16
This might seem to be even worse than purely outer directed
motivation. It may seem that Smith is saying that the agent is motivated
to obtain the sympathy and approval of a pretend person.17
But this is a mistake. Despite the division into what Smith calls "two
persons", the "examiner and judge" is not really any different from
"the person I call myself." The "examiner and judge" is the agent
himself or herself, viewing things from a certain perspective. When the
agent pretends to be an impartial spectator, he or she ends up approving
and disapproving from an impartial point of view. Viewing things in
that way can then influence the agent's motives and feelings, since it is
the agent who is doing the viewing and the approving and disapproving
and the approval or disapproval is of the agent himself or herself.
Consequently, the agent's actual motives will become more moral,
because they arc in part the result of the agent's looking at things from a
moral point of view. To the extent that the agent views things
impartially, the agent will genuinely not want to cheat and injure others.
What starts as a strategy for knowing what to do to obtain sympathy
ends up giving the agent a genuinely moral outlook that can motivate
moral behavior.
The truly moral agent does not aim at getting the sympathy of
impartial observers. Instead, the moral agent is motivated to act morally
by virtue of motives acquired by viewing things from an impartial
standpoint. The moral agent cares about the things that an impartial




Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith all put forward versions of the
impartial spectator theory. All three agree that right acts arc right
because they would be favored by impartial spectators who favor these
acts for other reasons than that the acts are right. But they disagree
about what explains spectators' reactions and what accounts for moral
motivation. They also disagree as to' whether the same thing explains
agents' motivation and spectators' approval.
Hutcheson and Hume agree that spectators' reactions derive from
benevolence. Hutcheson believes that benevolence is also the source of
moral motivation. Hume thinks this is too weak a motivation; he thinks
moral motivation is also based in self-interest. Where Hutcheson simply
treats benevolence as a God given motive, Hume offers an explanation
of benevolence in terms of what he calls sympathy.
Smith disagrees with Hume as to what sympathy is. Smith also
disagrees with both Hume and Hutcheson about the relevance of
benevolence. Smith argues that neither agents nor spectators are much
influenced by benevolence, although the desire for sympathy is impor
tant. Smith agreeswith Hutcheson and disagrees with Hume in holding
that moral motivation is of a piece with what it is that leads spectators to
approve or disapprove of various actions. What is important, according
to Smith, is the taking of an impartial view.
Smith works this theory out with a mass of detail which I cannot try
to summarize. I believe that the book in which he works this out, his
Theory of the Moral Sentiments, is one of the great works of moral
philosophy.
I conclude that the Impartial Spectator Theory has an answer to the
objection that it offers an overly aesthetic conception of morality, that it
overemphasizes the point of view of the spectator over the point of view
of the agent, and that it cannot account for the motivation to do what is
right.
This is not to say that I am convinced that this is the best theory. One
alternative is to try to develop what might be called an ideal agent or
ideal practical reasoner theory, as opposed to an ideal observer or
impartial spectator theory. This alternative would placeprimary empha
sis on moral reasons for acting, on the viewpoint of the agent. In one
version of this theory, the agent has moral principles that the agent
intends to follow. The agent's moral reasons typically derive from
principles the agent accepts as a member of a group.'"
I am not sure how to decide between the impartial spectator theory
and the ideal reasoner theory.
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So let me conclude witha couple of further commentson the history
of moral philosophy in the 18th Century.
Postscript 1
There is an interesting irony in the way in which Hume's use of the
term "sympathy" leads Smith to his own very different theory, a theory
that in my view is much better than Hume's at accounting for moral
phenomenology. Smith's criticism of Hume's use of the term "sympa
thy" is not a serious one. It is of no importance whatsoever whether the
meaning that Hume gives to the term "sympathy" is the ordinary one
and it in no way damages Hume's view for him to acknowledge that his
use is nonstandard. Hume can use the term however he wants. If he
wants to use it in a special sense in order to develop his own view, there
is nothing wrong with that. If someone really objects, the term can be
replaced with another. Nothing in Hume's viewdepends on his having
captured the ordinary meaning of the term "sympathy." The irony is
that taking Hume's term seriously leads Smith to a more accurate
account of morality. A purely verbal point yields a powerful substantive
theory.
Postscript 2
Finally, it is perplexing that Adam Smith's ethics should be so
relatively unread as compared with Hume's ethics when there is so
much of value in Smith. What I have talked about here only scratches
the surface. Why should Smith's ethics be so neglected? Is it that Hume
also had a metaphysics and an epistemologyand that Smith did not? Or
is it that Smith wasa more important economist than Hume? And why
should that matter? I do not know.19
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